The Consequences of Abundant Intelligence: New Zealand (CEO Edition)

CONFIDENTIAL SCENARIO ANALYSIS From The 2030 Report — June 30, 2030

DISCLAIMER & FRAMING

This document presents a plausible macroeconomic scenario based on documented AI trajectories as of early 2026. It is not a forecast or prediction. Rather, it explores one coherent narrative arc of how artificial intelligence disruption—already underway—could unfold across a small, open economy over a four-year horizon. Names, data points, and timelines are fictionalized for analytical clarity. This analysis was commissioned to challenge assumptions and broaden the aperture of strategic thinking.

MACRO MEMO HEADER

"Running a Company in a Post-Talent Market: CEO Strategy 2030"

Prepared for: New Zealand CEOs & Board Members Scenario Date: June 30, 2030 Perspective: Looking Back from H2 2030

THE OPENING STRIKE

NBR (National Business Review), April 2030: "CEO Confidence at Nine-Year Low. Why NZ Business Leaders Are Cutting Costs, Not Investing"

By June 2030, the CEO sentiment in New Zealand had shifted from optimism to defensive caution. A quarterly business confidence survey showed net confidence at -18 (scale from -100 to +100), the lowest since 2021.

The reason was straightforward: the business environment had become structurally different. Growth had slowed. Cost pressures had emerged from unexpected directions. Labor was simultaneously abundant (unemployment at 7%) and scarce (specific skills hard to find, leading workers leaving the country). Consumer spending was weakening but unevenly. The competitive landscape was shifting faster than traditional planning cycles could accommodate.

For a CEO managing a company in June 2030, the challenge wasn't to maximize growth—that option had largely disappeared. The challenge was to right-size the business for a smaller, slower-growing, more volatile economy, while managing the human and community consequences of that right-sizing.

HOW IT STARTED (2026-2027)

In 2026, most CEO conversations followed a familiar pattern. The external environment was okay. Growth was 2-3% annually. Unemployment was low. Profitability was stable. The constraint was scarcity: scarce talent, scarce customer growth, scarce expansion opportunities.

The corporate strategy was incremental: improve margins through efficiency, expand selectively through organic growth or small acquisitions, invest in capability building (especially tech capability). The mindset was: "We're in a low-growth economy; we need to optimize what we have and position for long-term."

By 2026-2027, some CEOs were beginning to notice whispers of change. AI adoption was accelerating. Some companies were experimenting with AI tools for customer service, data analysis, content generation. The results were mixed—sometimes the tools were genuinely valuable, sometimes they were hype—but the direction was clear: AI was coming into operations.

A few forward-thinking CEOs began to act:

• The Tech-First CEO positioned the company as "AI-forward," invested heavily in retraining, and began to quietly reduce headcount in areas where AI could automate work. They were trying to get ahead of the trend.
• The Traditional CEO watched with skepticism, invested cautiously, and continued with traditional business models. They figured that AI hype would eventually subside, and the fundamentals of the business would remain.
• The Worried CEO sensed something was coming but wasn't sure what, and so did nothing—a risky default strategy.

By late 2027, some sectors showed clearer signals:

• Dairy and agriculture companies began pilot programs with AI farming tools, testing precision feeding, herd health monitoring, and yield optimization. Early results were positive: costs down 10%, yields up 5-8%. The implication was obvious: fewer people would be needed to achieve the same or better productivity.
• Tourism companies noticed that customer acquisition costs were rising while margins were stable. Online travel agents were optimizing customers toward cheaper destinations. Tour operators realized they'd need to either compete on price (which meant lower margins or cutting costs, which meant cutting staff) or differentiate toward premium, which was a smaller market.
• Professional services firms saw the first wave of AI tools for legal document review, accounting, tax preparation, and consulting analysis. The tools weren't perfect, but they were good enough for junior-level work. The implication: do you need as many junior lawyers and accountants?

THE ACCELERATION (2028)

By 2028, the trends that had been whispers in 2026-2027 became roars.

Fonterra's Restructuring Strategy

Fonterra, New Zealand's largest company, announced a major restructuring in 2028. The narrative was "optimization and efficiency." The reality was labor displacement and organizational flattening.

Under the plan: - Farm management would be increasingly centralized and automated - Regional processing would consolidate (fewer plants, higher throughput) - White-collar functions would be streamlined with AI tools - Headcount reduction of approximately 15% over three years (roughly 4,500 employees out of 30,000)

The CEO spoke about "creating a more agile, efficient organization positioned for the future." What he meant was: we can do the same or more with fewer people.

But here's what was interesting from a CEO perspective: Fonterra did this in a rational, methodical way, with transition support, consultation with unions, and phased implementation. Other companies would follow similar playbooks. The disruption was happening, but it was being managed—not with cruelty, but also not with sacrifice to shareholder value.

The Real Estate Shock

By mid-2028, the housing market shock had begun to ripple through corporate real estate decisions.

Companies that owned significant real estate began to question their strategies. If the economy was slowing and recruitment was getting harder, did they need big, prestigious offices? Some companies that had planned major facility expansions in 2026-2027 canceled or postponed them.

More importantly, companies realized that as people were laid off or voluntarily left, the real estate became underutilized. A company that had 500 people in 2026 and 420 in 2028 was paying rent on 2000 square meters of office space for 1600 square meters of needs. Most companies' response was: consolidate, downsize, or renegotiate leases. This created negative commercial real estate pressures.

Margin Dynamics Shift

Most CEO saw their margin pressure come from labor and input costs growing faster than sales. By 2028, that was beginning to flip.

Labor was becoming more abundant (unemployment rising), so wage pressure eased. Input costs were stable or falling. But the problem was: sales growth was slowing faster than costs could be cut.

A typical mid-sized company saw this pattern: - 2026: Sales NZD 100M, EBITDA NZD 18M, margin 18% - 2027: Sales NZD 104M (4% growth), EBITDA NZD 19.6M (due to margin hold), margin 18.8% - 2028: Sales NZD 105M (1% growth), EBITDA NZD 17.9M (margin compression due to fixed cost leverage and price competition), margin 17.0%

To restore margins, companies had to cut costs. The largest cost for most companies was labor. So restructuring began.

The Employment Restructuring Wave

By 2028, most companies with more than 100 employees had either gone through or announced restructuring.

The language was consistent across sectors: - "Creating a more efficient organization" - "Rightsizing for current market conditions" - "Focusing on core capabilities" - "Investing in high-value roles, consolidating lower-value roles"

The reality was: jobs were disappearing. Some would be filled by AI tools. Some would simply vanish. Some would be offshored. Young people who might have been hired in entry-level roles in 2026 weren't being hired; existing junior staff were being let go or not replaced.

By late 2028, the cumulative impact on the labor market was visible: unemployment rising, youth employment struggling, wage growth stagnant.

THE NEW REALITY (2029-2030)

By June 2030, the CEO landscape had been fundamentally reshaped.

The Bifurcation of Strategy

By June 2030, CEO strategy had bifurcated into two camps:

Camp A: The Efficiency Play These CEOs had accepted that growth would be low and had optimized their organizations for profitability and cash generation in a slower-growth world. They'd cut headcount, automated functions, and moved to leaner operations. Their companies were often smaller but more profitable.

For example, a regional consulting firm had cut from 85 employees (2026) to 62 employees (2030), consolidated services, and automated junior work through AI tools. Profitability was higher (EBITDA margin up from 22% to 26%), but growth was zero. Revenue had fallen from NZD 18M to NZD 16.5M, but profit had risen from NZD 3.96M to NZD 4.29M.

The return on equity for shareholders had improved. But employment had fallen by 23 people.

Camp B: The Transformation Play These CEOs had accepted that traditional business models were disrupted and were attempting to transform toward new models. They might be investing heavily in AI capability, repositioning toward higher-margin services, or entering adjacent markets.

For example, a regional tourism company had stopped competing on volume (tours sold, visitors accommodated) and was repositioning toward premium, experiential, small-group tourism. This required retraining staff, building new brand positioning, and accepting that the market was smaller but higher-margin. Revenue down, profit margins up, but the strategy was: serve fewer customers at much higher value per customer.

Both strategies were rational given the constraints. But both involved either reducing employment or radically changing the nature of employment (fewer but higher-skilled/higher-wage roles).

By June 2030, there was essentially no CEO strategy that involved "maintain headcount and grow revenue." That option had effectively disappeared from the playbook.

The Talent Paradox

By June 2030, CEOs faced a strange paradox:

• Abundant low-skill labor: Unemployment was 7%, meaning there were plenty of people available for low-skill, low-wage work. But these roles were disappearing due to automation and efficiency-seeking.

• Scarce high-skill labor: Specific skills (machine learning, advanced software development, specialized trades, senior expertise) remained in short supply. But wages for these roles had become unaffordable for many companies.

• Brain drain: Talented people were leaving New Zealand for Australia and elsewhere. A 28-year-old engineer earning NZD 85,000 in Auckland could earn NZD 140,000+ in Sydney or NZD 130,000+ in San Francisco. The wage differentials were large enough that skilled people had economic incentive to leave.

The CEO's dilemma: they needed high-skill people but couldn't compete on wages with Australia and the US, and couldn't find affordable high-skill labor locally. The response was often: hire fewer people and make them more productive with AI tools, or accept lower skill levels and lower productivity.

The Software Opportunity

One silver lining for some NZ CEOs was that software and AI-adjacent services was one of the few growth sectors.

Companies that had the right expertise could build products for global markets and achieve significant scale. Xero's success had proven that a New Zealand-founded software company could compete globally.

But here's what was interesting by June 2030: there weren't many "Xeros" emerging. Software company formation and growth had slowed. The reasons were complex:

• Venture capital was available but was flowing to Australia and the US, not NZ
• Talent for software development was scarce and expensive
• The New Zealand market was small (no local scale advantage)
• Companies that did well either relocated to the US or were acquired by international companies

A few CEOs had made successful bets on software/tech positioning, but they were the exception, not the rule.

Managing Social Responsibility While Cutting Costs

By 2030, a theme was emerging in CEO discussions: how do you manage the moral/ethical dimensions of cutting jobs while trying to run a viable company?

Some CEOs took an ideological stance: "I'm running a business, not a social welfare program. If I don't remain profitable, everyone loses their jobs. So cutting costs is necessary."

Others were genuinely conflicted: "I know these are real people I'm letting go. Many have families, mortgages, limited options. But I also know that if I don't cut costs, the company might not survive, and then everyone loses."

A few had tried alternative approaches: - Slower, more gradual reductions (spreading pain over time) - Supporting displaced workers with training and outplacement services - Shortening work weeks instead of cutting headcount (which worked but was operationally complex and still reduced income) - Investing in community programs or foundations to offset employment losses

But these were marginal approaches. The core dynamic remained: profit pressure led to cost reduction, which led to job loss.

By June 2030, some CEOs were beginning to wonder if the traditional CEO mandate—maximize shareholder value—was becoming incompatible with social stability. But this was a minority position. Most had rationalized cost-cutting as necessary and moved on.

The SME Story

New Zealand's economy was largely driven by small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The median business had 10-15 employees.

For SMEs, the 2029-2030 environment was particularly harsh:

• Large companies had scale advantages: They could invest in AI tools, centralize functions, achieve productivity gains. The NZ Fonterra could pursue sophisticated strategies. A 200-person dairy cooperative couldn't.
• SMEs had limited capital: Investing in sophisticated AI tools or major retraining required capital that most SMEs didn't have. So they either did incremental automation (hiring fewer people) or fell behind.
• SMEs had limited talent: Attracting skilled people was harder for a 50-person company than a 500-person company. And if they did attract talented people, those people often left for larger companies or for Australia once they had experience.

By June 2030, the SME landscape showed increasing divergence: - Some SMEs had successfully repositioned toward niche markets or specialized services and were stable - Many SMEs were slowly contracting, with aging owner-operators and difficulty attracting and retaining younger staff - Some SMEs were being consolidated into larger entities (acquisition)

The risk by 2030 was that NZ's SME backbone was weakening, and without strong SME employment, there was no path back to full employment.

THE NUMBERS: BUSINESS IMPACT

Employment Changes (Sample Companies): - Large agriculture/dairy: Workforce down 12-18% (2026-2030); revenue stable to down 5%; profit up due to margin gains - Mid-size consulting/professional services: Workforce down 18-25%; revenue down 10-15%; profit flat to down slightly - Tourism/hospitality: Workforce down 15-22%; revenue down 18-25%; profit down 25-35% - Software/tech: Workforce up 8-15%; revenue up 18-30%; profit margin stable to slightly improving

Corporate Real Estate: - Office space utilization: Declined from 85-90% (2026) to 65-75% (2030) - Commercial real estate values: Down 15-22% (2026-2030) - Lease rates: Down 8-12% (2026-2030) due to oversupply

Profitability Trends: - 2026 median EBITDA margin for NZX companies: 22% - 2030 median EBITDA margin for NZX companies: 23% (stable due to cost-cutting offsetting revenue pressure) - But: Margin stability masked underlying stress—maintained through restructuring, not growth

Wages and Labor Costs: - Median wage growth (2026-2030): -2.1% in real terms - Entry-level wage growth: -8% in real terms - Senior/skilled wage growth: +1-3% in real terms (bifurcation) - Labor cost inflation: Below productivity gains, allowing margin maintenance through labor substitution

CEO Compensation Trends: - CEO median compensation (NZX listed companies): NZD 850,000 (2026) → NZD 1.1M (2030) - CEO to median employee wage ratio: 42:1 (2026) → 58:1 (2030) (widening)

STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR NEXT PHASE

By June 2030, CEOs faced three strategic pathways for 2030-2035:

Path A: Managed Decline with profitability Accept that the company won't grow but can be profitable at a smaller scale. Optimize for cash generation, harvest the business, prepare for exit or acquisition. This worked for mature companies in stable sectors but risked being overrun by competitors who pursued other paths.

Path B: Transformation and repositioning Invest in moving the business toward different markets, customer segments, or business models. This required capital, took years, and was risky, but offered the possibility of long-term growth. Worked for companies with strong management and adequate capital.

Path C: Regional/geographic expansion Rather than compete harder in NZ, expand into Australia and beyond. This meant relocating some operations, building new capabilities in new markets, and managing more complex cross-border operations. High risk/high reward.

By June 2030, most CEOs were pursuing something between Paths A and B—managed decline at home, selective investment in transformation. None were aggressively pursuing growth. The CEO imperative had shifted from "grow faster" to "manage decline better."

WHAT COMES NEXT: THE CEOS' BIGGEST QUESTION

The question haunting many NZ CEOs in June 2030 was: Is this permanent or temporary?

If the disruption is temporary (cyclical), then cutting costs is buying time until growth returns. If it's permanent (structural), then you need to transform the business.

The evidence in June 2030 suggested structural, but you could rationalize it either way. And that uncertainty—is this temporary or permanent?—made strategic decision-making incredibly difficult.

A CEO who aggressively transformed based on the assumption that disruption is permanent might waste resources if the cycle reverted. A CEO who held steady based on the assumption that this is temporary might be left behind if the disruption was structural.

By June 2030, most CEOs had decided to split the difference: invest modestly in transformation while maintaining cost discipline. But everyone knew this was a holding pattern, not a solution.

CLOSING REFLECTION

The CEO's world in June 2030 was one of constrained choice. The business environment had shifted in ways that made the traditional CEO playbook—growth through market expansion, operational leverage, capital investment—no longer viable.

Instead, CEOs were managing through scarcity, downscaling, and adaptation. They were doing this with competence and pragmatism, making rational decisions within constraints. But the constraints were new, and the destination was unclear.

The CEO who could clearly articulate what the company would look like in 2035—smaller? larger? repositioned? specialized?—and could chart a path to get there would succeed. The CEO who was simply managing year-to-year, hoping that trends would reverse, would be left behind.

By June 2030, most CEOs were still in the hoping phase. But the phase was ending. Decision time was coming.